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Catastrophic climatic events have accounted for 72% of global insurance claims and 
totaled ~$1 trillion from 1980 to 2012. Costs are driven by socio-economic developments 
and an increased frequency and severity of climatic disasters in which climate change 
may have been a contributing factor.  Climate change is projected to become a more 
prominent driver of these changes in the decades ahead. Government policies to reduce 
systemic risk have been the predominant approach for multi-level mitigation and 
adaptation to climate change. The analysis presented here shows how forceful and 
effective market-based approaches for adaptation and mitigation to climate change 
already operate via the insurance industry. Feedbacks from insurance to society include 
these primary changes: 1) premiums and insurance policies, 2) non-coverage, and 3) 
policy making and litigation (Chapter 1). Through these mechanisms, the insurance 
industry actively manages climate change adaptations and creates incentives to lessen 
impacts on industry and society. For mitigation of climate change, renewable energy-
based energy production has become more of a priority for utilities in recent years 
(Chapter 2).  However, renewable energy is competitively disadvantaged compared to 
fossil-fuel based systems due to high investment costs, the intermittent nature of 
renewables, and a lack of pricing for externalities (Chapter 2).   A model is used for 
calculating the total cost of a renewable utility and the cost of energy for that utility.  
Three scenarios were modeled (a null scenario with no incentive, an existing incentive in 
Nebraska, and a federal incentive that until recently was available to renewable utilities) 
to show the effects of incentives on the cost of production to the utility and the costs to 
the incentive providers. In Nebraska, the incentive was found to provide some relief to 
the utility compared to the null scenario and the federal incentive provided significantly 
more relief to the utility. Costs for the incentive investor with the federal incentive were 
significantly higher than with the Nebraska incentive, compared to the null scenario.  To 
develop renewable-energy production and mitigate climate change impacts, incentives 
enable market entry where externalities for fossil fuels are not adequately priced. 
Adaptation to climate change requires thorough understanding of how the impacts affect 
society (Chapter 1) and how society might mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate 
change (Chapter 2).  
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Chapter 1 
Climate Change Feedbacks Via Insurance 
Introduction 
Government policies have been the predominant multi-level approach to adapt to and 
mitigate the impacts of climate change1,2. Yet, past political agreements have been largely 
unsuccessful to reduce global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions necessary to avert 
probable widespread catastrophic effects2,3 and it is still too early to tell if the Conference 
of the Parties (COP) 21 agreement from December 2015 will succeed in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. Scientific and political controversies related to climate change 
have delayed policy implementation and future agreements will probably slowly be 
established4,5. The third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction produced an 
agreement, but was found to lack proactive engagement of climate change and indicated a 
gap in communication between the scientific community and policymakers6. While 
persistent limitations exist for creating effective global policies, the recent costs of 
climate change provide active feedbacks to business and society via the market 
mechanism of the insurance industry7,8,9,10,11. Feedbacks via insurance (i.e. a one-way 
reaction from the insurance industry to society in response to societal and environmental 
stimuli), have been under-recognized as mechanisms to induce adaptation and mitigation 
to climate change, primarily via the mechanisms of premium adjustments and insurance 
policy changes, non-coverage, and policy making and litigation. This analysis is the first 
to document the range of insurance-related feedbacks as adaptation and mitigation 
strategies.      
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Downside risks (risks with negative outcomes, such as losses) associated with 
weather-related disaster events are increasingly managed by the insurance industry, the 
largest global economic sector with revenue of $4.6 trillion or 7% of the global economy 
in 20118. Catastrophic climatic events have accounted for 72% of global property and 
casualty insurance claims and insured losses from 1980 to 2015, totaling $0.98 trillion, 
and these costs have been steadily increasing (Figure 1). The majority of global insured 
losses have occurred in North America, Central America, and the Caribbean12. These 
costs only account for catastrophic events, which are 40% of total insured losses 
compared to 60% of losses from smaller events13. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Increasing overall and insured losses globally from 1980 to 2015 for 
catastrophic events only. Source: Munich Re 2016. 
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Estimated weather-related costs have been ~0.5% of annual, global Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and real costs are increasing at ~6% per year5. Furthermore, 
recent projections estimate that $0.24-0.51 trillion in U.S. property will be below sea 
level by 210014. In 2016, the World Economic Forum ranked extreme weather events and 
natural catastrophes as the second and fifth most probable global economic risks to occur 
in the next 10 years15. Additionally, failure of climate change adaptation was ranked first 
in estimated negative global economic impacts over the next 10 years15. Socioeconomic 
development has been a primary factor for the rapid increase in recent global costs from 
climatic events10 and an increased frequency and magnitude of weather-related natural 
catastrophe costs (Figure 1.2) will result from the future interaction of climate change and 
socioeconomic development8,9,10,16,17. In addition, future economic costs will probably 
significantly increase if climate change is abrupt instead of gradual10,18.  
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Figure 1.2. Increasing loss events globally from 1980-2013 by type of event. Source: 
Munich Re.  
 
Because of the nonlinear changes associated with climate (e.g. sea-level rise), 
experience over the last 50-100 years has been identified as an ineffective predictor of 
future insurance losses8. Table 1.1 lists the top 10 costliest disasters by overall losses 
from 1980-2015, all of which occurred 1994 or after and seven of which occurred in the 
last 10 years. As conditions change due to climate change, the ability to effectively 
determine risk is reduced4,5,13.  
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Table 1.1. Ten costliest events ordered by overall losses worldwide 1980-2015 Source: 
Munich Re. 
Date Event Affected Area Overall Losses 
in US$ m 
Insured losses 
in US$ m 
Fatalities 
11.3.2011  Earthquake, 
tsunami  
Japan: Aomori, Chiba, Fukushima, 
Ibaraki, Iwate, Miyagi, Tochigi, 
Tokyo, Yamagata  
210,000  40,000  15,880  
25-30.8.2005  Hurricane 
Katrina, storm 
surge  
United States: LA, MS, AL, FL  125,000  60,500  1,720  
17.1.1995  Earthquake  Japan: Hyogo, Kobe, Osaka, Kyoto  100,000  3,000  6,430  
12.5.2008  Earthquake  China: Sichuan, Mianyang, 
Beichuan, Wenchuan, Shifang, 
Chengdu, Guangyuan, Ngawa, 
Ya'an  
85,000  300  84,000  
23-31.10.2012  Hurricane Sandy, 
storm surge  
Bahamas, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto 
Rico, United States, Canada  
68,500  29,500  210  
17.1.1994  Earthquake  United States: Northridge, Los 
Angeles, San Fernando Valley, 
Ventura  
44,000  15,300  61  
1.8-15.11.2011  Floods, 
landslides  
Thailand: Phichit, Nakhon Sawan, 
Phra Nakhon Si Ayuttaya, 
Phthumthani, Nonthaburi, Bangkok  
43,000  16,000  813  
6-14.9.2008  Hurricane Ike  United States, Cuba, Haiti, 
Dominican Republic, Turks and 
Caicos Islands, Bahamas  
38,000  18,500  170  
27.2.2010  Earthquake, 
tsunami  
Chile: Concepción, Metropolitana, 
Rancagua, Talca, Temuco, 
Valparaiso  
30,000  8,000  520  
23./24./27.10.2004  Earthquake  Japan: Honshu, Niigata, Ojiya, 
Tokyo, Nagaoka, Yamakoshi  
28,000  760  46 
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Insurers function on a few assumptions about insurable risks: they are quantifiable 
(the risk is largely constant over the insurable period and well understood, assuming the 
law of large numbers), diversifiable (one type of risk may not be a function of another, 
such as home and auto insurance being independent), fortuitous (may or may not 
happen), and economically priced (the policyholder can afford to pay)19. The three 
primary feedback mechanisms used by insurance to manage and drive adaptation and 
mitigation are changes in premium prices and insurance policies, non-coverage, and 
policy making and litigation (Figure 1.3). The following sections describe the forceful 
and extensive mechanisms by which the insurance industry manages private property, 
infrastructure, energy, agriculture, healthcare, and government.  
 
Figure 1.3. Cycle of feedbacks from climate change via insurance. 
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Feedbacks via Premium Prices and Policy-induced Adaptation 
Insurance is a risk management tool which absorbs ~40% of costs from catastrophes in 
developed countries20. Insurance premiums act as a signal of the average probability of a 
loss9. Premiums from policyholders cover claims, administration fees, and offer a profit 
to insurers over a designated time period21. Insurers will only offer catastrophe insurance 
if premiums are able to be priced sufficiently and where risks are not excessively 
uncertain22,23,24. As natural disasters increase in frequency and severity, premiums must 
increase to cover the newly realized insurers’ costs and associated unknown risks (Table 
1.2).  The increase in premiums to cover the costs and unknown risks may leave 
previously insured assets without insurance and greatly exposed to losses24,25. Premiums 
will also probably increase as a result of socio-economic development, but this is region 
specific and uncertain26.  
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Table 1.2. Ten costliest events ordered by insured losses worldwide 1980-2015 Source: 
Munich Re. 
Date Event Affected area Overall 
losses in 
US$ m 
Insured 
losses in 
US$ m 
Fatalities 
25-30.8.2005  Hurricane Katrina, 
storm surge  
United States: LA, MS, AL, FL  125,000  60,500  1,720  
11.3.2011  Earthquake, 
tsunami  
Japan: Aomori, Chiba, Fukushima, Ibaraki, 
Iwate, Miyagi, Tochigi, Tokyo, Yamagata  
210,000  40,000  15,880  
23-31.10.2012  Hurricane Sandy, 
storm surge  
Bahamas, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, United States, 
Canada  
68,500  29,500  210  
6-14.9.2008  Hurricane Ike  United States, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican 
Republic, Turks and Caicos Islands, 
Bahamas  
38,000  18,500  170  
23-27.8.1992  Hurricane Andrew  United States: FL, LA; Bahamas  26,500  17,000  62  
22.2.2011  Earthquake  New Zealand: Canterbury, Christchurch, 
Lyttelton  
24,000  16,500  185  
1.8-15.11.2011  Floods, landslides  Thailand: Phichit, Nakhon Sawan, Phra 
Nakhon Si Ayuttaya, Phthumthani, 
Nonthaburi, Bangkok  
43,000  16,000  813  
17.1.1994  Earthquake  United States: Northridge, Los Angeles, 
San Fernando Valley, Ventura  
44,000  15,300  61  
19-24.10.2005  Hurricane Wilma  Bahamas, Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, 
United States  
22,000  12,500  44  
June - 
September 2012  
Drought  United States: AR, CO, GA, IA, IL, IN, 
KS, KY, MO, MS, MT, NE, OH, OK, SD, 
TN, TX, WI, WY  
25,000  12,000  
 
Premiums are the initial cost of an insurance policy. High initial costs generally 
deter customers and this includes insurance premiums21. Financial viability of policies 
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relies on the application of differential pricing for different cover limits and 
deductibles21. If total-coverage premiums are priced too high for a majority of 
consumers, then many will choose lower cost policies with less coverage. If these are not 
available or are also priced too high, then many consumers may choose not to purchase 
insurance, which reduces insurance profits and exposes the consumer to risk7,24,27.  
High premiums may be a sign from insurers that there is a large amount of risk or 
uncertainty or that more risk management by at-risk parties is needed21. Losses from 
disaster events were found to be rising faster than premiums in some cases7. If premiums 
increase too quickly, consumers may choose not to insure or governments may intervene 
to set limits on premiums where premiums are priced too high for the majority of 
policyholders, which in both cases may cause insurers to not offer coverage21, as in 
Florida in 201028.   
Where premiums are unable to reflect the true costs of a policy, methods of risk 
reduction are needed, such as adaptation measures. Individual adaptation or societal 
mitigation can lead to a decrease in risk to insurers25,28,29. There are financial benefits of 
adaptation to climate change27 such as cost savings associated with a reduction in risk. In 
a hard-market scenario, where recent events led to higher premiums and full adaptation 
(i.e. all buildings retrofitted to meet building code 2004 in Florida), annual premium 
costs were projected to decrease to $5-6 billion after adaptation compared to $10-14 
billion with the existing status of buildings28. If all structures also met the requirements 
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set forth by the Institute for Business and Home Safety, the losses from a 1-in-500-year 
hurricane hitting Florida would be reduced by 50% compared to current levels28. 
 Empirical studies show many people do not voluntarily invest in adaptation 
measures even when they are cost effective29. The challenges of reducing the impact of 
natural disasters is clear from recent catastrophes and the losses associated with them, as 
well as the failure of residents in these hazard-prone areas to invest in adaptation 
measures29,30,31. Yet, strong market pressure and marketable solutions have been shown 
to incentivize people to adopt adaptation measures, such as catastrophe bonds which 
transfer peak risks to capital markets30.  
Experts commonly assess weather-related risks by making best estimates of the 
probability and potential damage of a hazard using statistical techniques or catastrophe 
models10.  These expert assessments, however, often have little influence on actual 
decision making about risk by lay persons32. Lay persons often use very simple rules 
when they assess risks, which can be described as heuristics33. Media outlets are 
becoming more interested in climate change issues and expert opinions are being brought 
more to light, changing the frame of media coverage34. Individuals may use a so-called 
‘availability heuristic’ in judging natural hazard risk, which implies that they judge an 
event as risky when it is easy to imagine or remember32. People’s perception of risk often 
reflects the automatic, emotional, non-analytic thinking rather than a statistical 
concept26,35. This perception of risk can influence people’s decisions for insurance 
coverage and other preparations for natural catastrophes.   
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A combination of measures that limit damage and reduce the probability of 
natural catastrophes has been shown to be the most effective way of reducing extreme 
costs36.  Insurers may require households to undertake such measures to mitigate damage 
or to take precautionary measures29,37,38. These measures may also lead to policy benefits 
such as premium discounts or higher levels of coverage due to increased risk reduction 
behaviors39. These behaviors may also reduce post-disaster risk due to failures in 
structures or environmental contaminants after a disaster40. Precautionary measures have 
seen some success internationally, such as the flood damage in Germany during the 
extreme flood of the Elbe in 200239,40,41. Another example is through the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP) in the U.S. that, after setting compulsory mitigation standards, 
reduced flood losses on new structures by a factor of six42, but the NFIP failed to restrain 
development in flood plains potentially due to premiums not being risk based and being 
subsidized43. Past experiences from other countries show mitigation measures at a 
household level can be effective in limiting flood damage, reducing costs for insurers 
over the long term39.  This same experience may be applied to other aspects of insurance 
with further research.   
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Table 1.3. Ten costliest flood events ordered by insured losses worldwide 1980-2015 
Source: Munich Re. 
Date Event Affected area Overall losses 
in US$ m  
Insured losses 
in US$ m  
Fatalities 
1.8-15.11.2011  Floods, landslides  Thailand: Phichit, Nakhon Sawan, 
Phra Nakhon Si Ayuttaya, 
Pathumthani, Nonthaburi, 
Bangkok  
43,000  16,000  813  
12-22.8.2002  Floods, flash floods  Germany, Austria, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Moldova, 
Switzerland, Slovakia  
16,500  3,400  39  
25-30.6.2007  Floods, severe 
storms  
United Kingdom: England  4,000  3,000  4  
30.5-19.6.2013  Floods  Austria, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Hungary, Poland, 
Switzerland  
12,500  3,000  25  
20-23.7.2007  Floods  United Kingdom: England, Wales  4,000  3,000  1  
10-14.1.2011  Floods, flash floods  Australia: Queensland, Brisbane, 
Ipswich, Toowoomba, Grantham, 
Gladstone  
3,200  1,900  22  
20-28.8.2005  Floods  Austria, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Switzerland  
3,300  1,800  11  
19-24.6.2013  Floods, severe 
storms  
Canada: Alberta, Calgary, 
Canmore, High River, Medicine 
Hat, Bragg Creek  
5,700  1,600  4  
October - 
November 
2000  
Floods  United Kingdom, Ireland  2,000  1,500  10  
27.6-15.8.1993  Floods  United States: MS, MO, IA, IL, 
ND, IN, MN, WI, KS, NE, SD  
21,000  1,300  48 
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How might insurers appeal to policyholders to adopt mitigation and adaptation 
measures? One possible solution is multi-year contracts, which would make the benefits 
of adaptation clearer as the probability of a disaster during the time frame would be 
higher22,29,30. Another possible solution provides incentives to households to limit 
damage from floods by purchasing relevant materials and taking related action37,39. 
Insurance companies can incentivize policyholders by abandoning riskier markets, raising 
premiums, insisting on greater deductibles or lowering coverage, and refusing to insure 
property without a list of protective measures44. Other incentives used in the past to 
reduce risk include founding of government services in areas previously without the 
service (e.g. fire departments) and regulations (e.g. advocating for building codes or auto 
safety)19. Though potentially effective, these measures are similar to building waste 
treatment facilities for a polluted river rather than redesigning the processes that dumped 
the effluents into the river44. More proactive engagement of risk management is a 
valuable investment and ultimately reduces insured losses45. In crop insurance, insurers 
may offer a premium discount if the insured adopted a risk reducing practice. For 
example, premiums were reduced where producers planted a specific drought-tolerant 
corn hybrid that was later widely adopted and the discount discontinued.  
 
Feedbacks via Non-coverage 
Inaction is a major factor contributing to negative economic impacts from climate 
change45. Non-coverage is the undesired result of inaction, of which there are two 
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subtypes.  The first is where insurance premiums are not allowed to reflect true risk, 
leading insurers to not offer a policy.  The second type of non-coverage is when 
premiums are allowed to reflect true risk, but the premiums and deductibles (amount paid 
out-of-pocket for a claim) are too costly for the consumer to purchase the policy9,40,45. 
Both scenarios result in uninsured property, persons, or development that leave 
consumers, industry, and the economy at risk.   
Non-coverage is a market failure associated with the forceful mechanisms of the 
insurance industry on society. Non-coverage is the result of a lack of communication and 
ability to provide feedback between society and the insurance industry.  As a result, we 
can view non-coverage as an indicator of where failure in these mechanisms occur. Non-
coverage can also be used as a deterrent of compounding harmful behaviors related to 
climate change similar to non-coverage as a deterrent for other safety and health 
violations7, 27,45.  
In the case of a standard insurance policy, two conditions must be met in order for 
insurers to willingly offer insurance23. Insurers must be able to quantify the probability 
and severity of an uncertain event, and insurers must be able to set premiums for each 
customer or group of customers23. As further climate science and related research is 
completed and becomes publically available, the comprehension of climate change as a 
risk source increases and the probability of non-coverage decreases. But as this 
understanding increases, the perceived risks might increase, causing a rise in premiums in 
order to cover the potential losses6,7,23,45. This places the economic burden on the 
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consumer and can result in non-coverage by choice on part of the consumer, and result in 
an availability-affordability crisis45. Non-coverage also pressures public organizations to 
assume more climate risks which may lead to more federal debt, such as when the 
National Flood Insurance program insured damage from Hurricanes Katrina and Ike9,24.    
 
 
Figure 1.4. Financing climatic loss at different levels of risk. 
 
Financing of risks can come from a variety of sources (Figure 1.4).  The primary 
source is the party itself through non-coverage (savings or working capital) for risky 
events that are frequent and not severe. The next category, credit, protects against events 
that are somewhat frequent and severe enough where the party converts equity into cash 
in order to pay for the event. The final category, insurance, covers events that are rare and 
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have high financial impacts; equity alone cannot cover the financial cost of these events.  
The insurance category differs from the credit category because they communicate with 
the party through an offered premium.  The ability of the party to self-insure (i.e. have 
available funds, as opposed to gambling) and/or have access to credit will vary highly 
upon party characteristics whereas insurance will be offered across almost all 
characteristics.  As a result, there could exist a large gap between insurance and non-
coverage.   
 Change in risks will lead to a change in probability of experiencing an event in 
non-coverage, credit, and insurance, leading to updated communication between 
insurance and parties.  To lower the probability of non-coverage and credit events, as the 
probability of rare, financially costly events increase (fattening of the tail in Figure 1.4), 
insurance companies are required to charge a higher premium to cover higher expected 
losses. This communication can lead to adaptation by the party to minimize the new risk.  
In turn at some point in the future, the insurance company will lower premiums because 
parties took action that lowers risk. 
 Events leading up to non-coverage and the effects of non-coverage can be seen in 
the Saint Bernard Parish district of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina24. Hurricane 
Katrina caused total insured losses ≥$41 billion46. This amount of damage and risk has 
turned insurers away and now a house in the Saint Bernard Parish district (and many 
other parts of New Orleans) is virtually uninsurable, causing the districts to remain near 
barren as the area is unaffordable46. The risk for insurers to insure parts of New Orleans 
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is extremely high and the lack of understanding of these risks also plays a part in keeping 
premiums too high to afford or for a lack of available insurance46. Hurricane Katrina was 
estimated as a 1-in-396-year storm, meaning that any given year has a 0.25 percent 
chance of seeing such a storm by the US Army Corps of Engineers46.  However, the 
company Risk Management Solutions saw Hurricane Katrina as a 1-in-40-year storm 
causing some dissension in interpretation of significant natural catastrophe risk46. The 
lack of understanding and significant losses caused many insurance agencies to choose to 
not provide coverage and a similar situation could occur in other places as more extreme 
events occur (Table 1.4).   
 
Feedbacks via Policymaking and Litigation 
Laws give our governmental system power to protect its citizens and to standardize 
responses to issues or problems. With the complexity of climate change, widespread 
political action has either been criticized because climate change regulation may 
exacerbate other problems, or favored because standardization of responses to climate 
change may strengthen the effectiveness of solutions and greatly diminish problems. The 
insurance industry has a role in influencing policy and regulation9,11,38.   
Government policies impact the insurance industry directly by exempting parties 
from liability, subsidizing insurance deductibles or premiums, engaging in reinsurance, or 
providing coverage that competes with private sector insurance7. The role of government 
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in natural disaster relief has decreased over the last 20 years as insurance coverage of 
natural disaster relief has increased from 20% to 40% in developed countries24.  
Table 1.4. Ten costliest storm events ordered by insured losses worldwide 1980-2015 
Source: Munich Re. 
Date Event Affected area Overall losses 
in US$ m 
Insured losses 
in US$ m 
Fatalities 
25-30.8.2005  Hurricane Katrina, 
storm surge  
United States: LA, MS, AL, FL  125,000  60,500  1,720  
23-31.10.2012  Hurricane Sandy, 
storm surge  
Bahamas, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, United 
States, Canada  
68,500  29,500  210  
6-14.9.2008  Hurricane Ike  United States, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican 
Republic, Turks and Caicos Islands, 
Bahamas  
38,000  18,500  170  
23-27.8.1992  Hurricane Andrew  United States: FL, LA; Bahamas  26,500  17,000  62  
19-24.10.2005  Hurricane Wilma  Bahamas, Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Mexico, United States  
22,000  12,500  44  
7-21.9.2004  Hurricane Ivan, 
storm surge  
United States, Caribbean, Venezuela, 
Colombia, Mexico  
23,000  11,800  120  
20-24.9.2005  Hurricane Rita, 
storm surge  
United States: FL, LA, MS, TX  16,000  9,600  10  
11-14.8.2004  Hurricane Charley  United States, Cuba, Jamaica, Cayman 
Islands  
18,000  8,000  36  
22-28.4.2011  Tornadoes, severe 
storms  
United States: AL, AR, GA, IL, LA, 
MO, MS, OK, PA, TN, TX, VA  
11,000  7,300  350  
20-27.5.2011  Tornadoes, severe 
storms  
United States: AR, GA, IL, IA, IN, 
KS, KY, MD, MI, MN, MO, NC, NE, 
NY, OH, OK, PA, TN, TX, VA, VT  
10,000  6,900  178 
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 Many countries with smaller economies are finding significant trouble in 
financing natural disaster relief due to budget constraints, limited tax bases, and existing 
debt24.  While countries with large economies still have a buffer to protect them from 
these widespread losses, as the rate and severity of natural disasters increases, the ability 
of this buffer to protect nations from the crippling effects of widespread losses is 
dwindling in the wake of disasters9,24. Reliance on outside aid from other nations is a risk 
as there is no contractual obligation for donor aid and this type of disaster relief is subject 
to political and societal uncertainty24.   As the need for more effective natural disaster 
relief becomes apparent, many governments are beginning to rely on insurance as a major 
tool to provide a reliable system to their citizens9,24,45.  
Insurance has a role in creating policy and regulation as well. The Affordable 
Care Act had several influencing factors in its design and implementation but 
contributions from the health insurance industry played a key role in the eventual 
compromised bill27. The insurance industry’s influence brought them several victories in 
the bill including lower shares of medical costs over the governments cost involvement 
compared to early proposals of the bill, nearly complete eradication of government rate 
regulation, and most importantly, government subsidies for low-income clients27.  Health 
insurance is but one facet of the insurance industry. Other bills have been influenced that 
involved other sectors of the insurance industry, such as life insurance, property and 
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casualty insurance (mostly on a state level rather than a federal level), and crop 
insurance. Another example of government and insurance industry interaction is in the 
Federal Crop Insurance program. The government interacts with the insurance companies 
by sharing in reinsurance losses and gains.  For example, if there was a widespread 
drought the insurance company will share with the government in payments to producers.  
Alternatively, if premiums were larger than payments (a reinsurance gain) then the 
government receives a portion of the gain.  The level of sharing depends upon the size of 
the loss.  Larger losses, which puts pressure on the company to fail, are absorbed at a 
higher rate by the government.  This risk sharing strategy aims to provide efficient and 
effective disaster relief by minimizing the probability of insurance company failure and 
government expenses in providing ad hoc disaster aid packages.     
The insurance industry influences government and society through campaign 
donations, lobbying, advertisements, and other monetary and social means. On a national 
level the Affordable Care Act brought together proponents of health insurance on a 
matter that affects all of them and high levels of influence was shown27. The insurance 
industry also has lobbying influence at the state level of government where the bulk of 
insurance regulation is drafted27. If the same level of influence is brought to climate 
change insurance issues, which affect every sector directly or indirectly, the insurance 
industry can have input to the laws and regulations (or lack thereof) that contribute to 
climate change costs and be a key part of compromise solutions.   
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 The insurance industry interacts with the public sector in providing protection 
against risks though there is always disagreement over the allocations of costs7.  In the 
Saint Bernard district of New Orleans, the insurance agencies sent assessors allegedly not 
to help those stricken by the disaster but to avoid paying out on their policies by asserting 
that damage was caused by floods and not wind47.  The insurance agencies had policies 
that offered protection against wind damage while the government provided policies that 
offered protection against flood damage (through the National Flood Insurance 
Program)47. The lack of cohesion in the economic response to Hurricane Katrina is one 
example of non-optimized risk allocation that resulted in $109 billion in post-disaster 
assistance and $8 billion in tax relief provided by the government48. For insurance and 
government to be more efficient and effective at disaster adaptation, mitigation, and 
relief, there must be more cooperative policy, but due to the immense costs from climate 
change there will probably continue to be significant disagreements over the distribution 
of costs between the two sectors. 
Litigation from insurance to government has been the result of ineffective policy 
or failure to reasonably foresee and adapt to the impacts of climate change. In 2013, The 
Farmers Insurance Co. sued the city of Chicago, Illinois for damages caused by storm 
water and sewage overflow on the basis that the local municipalities knew that the 
drainage systems were inadequate but failed to take reasonable action to prevent these 
damages48. The charges were eventually withdrawn by Farmers Insurance Co., stating 
that the important issues were brought to the attention of the respective cities and 
counties and with the hope that policyholders’ interests will be protected in the future48.  
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As climate change impacts are further researched and understanding of these impacts 
grows, it is probable that more government entities will be held responsible for damages 
caused by climate change if proactive action is not taken to increase system resiliency48. 
Higher insurance losses and more claims due to the impacts of climate change will 
increase the pressure of feedback from the insurance industry to government and will 
probably increase the amount of litigation unless insurance and government work 
together to protect policyholders and adapt and mitigate to the impacts of climate change.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Properly priced insurance delivers value to consumers when it covers events that are both 
rare and highly costly to individuals but common to society25.  Natural catastrophes fit 
this category and can have devastating costs that affect members of society and the 
insurance industry49. The occurrence and severity of these natural catastrophes are 
increasing9,10,24. Increased losses will challenge insurance systems to adapt and offer 
affordable coverage and society to adapt and mitigate impacts from climate change10.  
Risk financing systems, including insurance, will need to be cautious of downside risks 
that can cause disincentives, market failures, and decrease equity10. Through improved 
research, the interactions between the insurance industry and society can create more 
efficient and effective risk management strategies for public and private interests to 
address the challenges from climate change10. The risk from climate change to insurers 
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comes from its changing nature. The earth is a complex adaptive system, and non-
linearity leads to unintended and unexpected outcomes that are unforeseeable. 
Encouraging proactive cooperation between private insurers and government can increase 
the likelihood that mitigation techniques and adaptation can align incentives to protect the 
environment. Premiums and policy-based adaptation, non-coverage, and policy making 
and litigation all provide forceful feedbacks from insurance to society. Feedback from the 
insurance industry to society affects all levels of insurance and so affects the interactions 
of the insurance industry across all industries (e.g. energy, infrastructure, agriculture, 
health). With investments in these industries, the insurance industry will be extensively 
affected by climate change. The insurance industry will continue to be a forceful and 
extensive mechanism to drive adaption and mitigation measure to climate change impacts 
in the absence of, and alongside, effective government policies.  
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Chapter 2 
The Effect of a Financial Incentive on Renewable Energy Production 
Introduction 
To mitigate climate change and develop competitive renewable energy, the need for 
financial incentives (defined as a payment or concession that incites or tends to incite to 
action or greater effort, or as a reward for increased productivity) is largely accepted as 
fact among those in renewable energy50.  The opposition to providing incentives for 
renewable energy often occurs because incentives are seen as either aid from the 
government or an additional tax. Most financial incentives are largely based in 
government policies and there is often disagreement on incentives among groups with 
competing interests50,51, whether it is the nature of the incentive itself or the origin of the 
incentive.  The political nature of incentives can serve to limit the number of incentives 
offered for renewable energy and to hinder the production of smaller scale utilities52.  
Large utility companies that depend on coal, and some on nuclear, for electricity 
generation make entrance into the electricity market difficult for small scale utilities or 
intermittent utilities that deliver renewable electricity52. The first chapter of this thesis 
discussed the climate externalities of fossil fuels as captured in premium prices and the 
insurance industry. The real costs of climate change (Chapter 1) are not included in the 
prices of fossil fuels, because these externalities are not recognized; a phenomenon 
similar for a wide range of products, such as produce or wood production53. Renewable 
energy incentives provide necessary support for entry into the market when externalities 
are not included in the price of fossil fuels.  
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 Incentives provide a firm foundation to enable new products to enter a market.  If 
society prioritizes renewable energy production it is imperative for incentives to be 
offered so that renewable energy sources can compete with industries like oil, natural gas, 
coal, and other fossil-fuel based industries, which receive their own subsidies and have 
not comprehensively incorporated externalities50.  According to the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, coal-produced energy accounted for 16% of total primary 
energy consumption in 2015.  Natural gas-produced energy accounted for 29%, oil-
produced accounted for 36%, nuclear energy accounted for 9%, and all renewable-
produced (hydro-electric, geothermal, solar/PV, wind, and biomass) accounted for 10% 
of consumption54.  In total, fossil fuels accounted for 81% of total primary energy 
consumption in 2015, and only 19% from non-fossil fuel sources.   
Incentives help lower the starting costs of a utility and can serve to bring the cost 
of renewables to an economically competitive level in the current market, one without 
adequately priced externalities55. Electricity purchase from renewable sources is low 
(around 2-3%) except in cases where there are strong incentives such as tax exemptions 
for electricity consumers56.  Garcia et al.50 says “Given the comparatively higher costs of 
renewable technologies (e.g. wind, solar) there appears to be a consensus on the need for 
regulatory intervention to promote investment in these technologies.”   
 In the United States, incentives differ from state to state and the types and amount 
of incentives vary greatly.  According to the Database of State Incentives for Renewable 
Energy (DSIRE), which was created in a joint effort by the U.S. Department of Energy 
and the North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center, there exists only 19 total 
renewable energy incentives in Nebraska, of which only a few are available for large-
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scale or small-scale utilities and the rest being residential options or policies.  
Comparatively, California (known for its progressive environmental stance and laws) has 
nearly 180 different renewable energy incentives, of which a larger proportion are 
available to large-scale utilities and more options for residential and small-scale utilities.  
This is in part due to the nature and political climate of Nebraska energy.  Nebraska is the 
only state with 100% public power meaning all utilities are publically owned and are 
legislatively mandated to use the most inexpensive and reliable energy sources.   
 For large-scale utilities to be developed, incentives must also be developed to 
allow renewable energy utilities to be competitive with fossil-fuel based utilities55. The 
purpose of this chapter is to compare state and federal scenarios that incentivize 
renewable energy development. Data were used to examine the effects an incentive has 
on the price of energy and on the revenue needed to break even within a large-scale 
renewable utility.   The need for incentives to develop renewable energy projects are 
discussed as well as the capital needed to provide these incentives if renewable energy 
production is a priority for society.  
 
Methods 
To compare state and federal scenarios for incentives for renewable energy development, 
an existing cost model was needed to calculate the total cost of a large-scale utility and 
the cost of energy for that utility.  The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) 
published a document that highlighted several cost models called Renewable Energy Cost 
Modeling: A Toolkit for Establishing Cost-Based Incentives in the United States57.  To 
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establish a standard, only one model was needed.  The California Renewable Energy 
Transmission Initiative (RETI) model (Black & Veatch Corp.) was chosen due to its 
simplicity in calculating costs and the omission of extraneous variables.  This model is 
not limited to one renewable energy technology so it is versatile in the scenarios it can 
handle.   
While the inputs to the model are basic and may not be sufficient in some 
environments, it has all the inputs needed to generate a cost of electricity (COE) 
analysis57.  The model takes into account several factors including user-defined equity 
return requirements, debt parameters, operation costs, taxes, and several other inputs. The 
most important inputs for the purpose of this paper are the incentives. Creating incentives 
for electricity producers to adopt renewable energy technologies allows public policies to 
be aimed at stimulating technical change and learning processes that enable costs to be 
brought down to an economically competitive level55.  Incentives are not based on 
resources and do not have an inherent cost to them.  They are highly variable and can 
play a significant role in making renewable energy cost-effective55,58.  If escalation 
assumptions (the assumed rise in costs of a component of energy production over time) 
are given (Fixed O&M escalation, Variable O&M escalation, etc.) then the model 
generates a levelized cost of energy (LCOE) which is the main output of the system. The 
LCOE is the generalized cost of energy in order for the project to break even over the 
lifetime of the project.  Standard technology assumptions were held constant in the RETI 
model (values shown in Table 2.1).   
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Table 2.1. Standard Technology Assumptions section of RETI model with assumed 
standard values 
Project Capacity (MW) 60 
Capital Cost ($/kW) $2,000  
Fixed O&M ($/kW) $35  
Fixed O&M Escalation 2.50% 
Variable O&M ($/MWh) $10  
Variable O&M Escalation 2.50% 
Fuel Cost ($/MBtu) $0  
Fuel Cost Escalation 0.00% 
Heat Rate (Btu/kWh) 0 
Capacity Factor 37% 
Misc Revenue ($/MWh) $5  
Misc Escalation 2.50% 
Degradation 2% 
 
 
Values were changed to better reflect the actual total cost of an average wind farm 
but due to data constraints many values were set at the default RETI model standards.   
Project capacity was set at 60 MW to reflect an average large-scale wind energy project 
in Nebraska59, specifically modeled after the Flat Water wind farm near Humboldt, 
Nebraska. Capital cost was set at $2,000 per kilowatt (kW) to reflect average capital 
costs60. Fixed Operation & Maintenance (O&M) costs were set at $17/kW as the average 
cost61.  Variable O&M are the costs associated with O&M that may change depending on 
the amount of electricity generated.  This value was set as the default value from the 
RETI model along with the escalation of both O&M costs.  Fuel cost was set at $0, fuel 
29 
 
cost escalation at 0%, and Heat Rate at 0 BTU/kWh because of the nature of wind energy 
electricity generation. Capacity factor is the percentage the plant is operating compared to 
the maximum (if it was operating all the time). The capacity factor was set at 37% as the 
average capacity factor61.  Miscellaneous revenue, escalation and degradation were set at 
$5, 2.5%, and 2% respectively as the default values from the RETI model.  Some values 
were kept at the default setting of the RETI model due to a lack of easily accessed data 
for wind energy farms and because they are simply standard values and are not subject to 
analysis they were set as the default for the sake of ease.  Standard Financial/Economic 
Assumptions were held constant in the RETI model (values shown in Table 2.2).   
 
Table 2.2. Standard Financial/Economic Assumptions section of RETI model with 
assumed standard values 
Debt Percentage 60% 
Debt Rate 6.50% 
Debt Term (years) 15 
Economic Life (years) 25 
Percent 5-year MACRS 100% 
Percent 7-year MACRS 0% 
Percent 15-year MACRS 0% 
Percent 20-year MACRS 0% 
Energy Price Escalation 2.5% 
Tax Rate 39% 
Cost of Equity 7.75% 
Discount Rate 8.000% 
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 Debt percentage, debt rate, debt term, economic life, percent 5-year MACRS, 
energy price escalation, and cost of equity were set as the default values of the RETI 
model because they were common values (debt term, economic life) associated with 
renewable energy projects or were project-dependent variables and no one value was 
commonly attributed to it (debt percentage, debt rate).  The tax rate was set to 39% as the 
average tax rate61.  The discount rate was set to 8.00%61.   
 The RETI model gives the LCOE as the main output.  The LCOE serves as the 
point of comparison for the scenarios outlined in this article.  Three scenarios were 
modeled using the RETI model and with LCOE as the output.  First, a null scenario was 
created using the default standards (listed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2) with no incentive.  
Second, a Renewable Energy Tax Credit scenario was factored into the model.  This 
scenario kept all values as the null scenario except for the incentive category, which was 
changed to $0.50/MWh. Third, a Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit scenario 
was developed in which a large incentive currently offered federally (Renewable 
Electricity Production Tax Credit) is factored into the model.  
The total amount needed to break even (total revenue is equal to total costs over 
the lifespan of the project) is calculated by multiplying the LCOE times the capacity of 
the project (60 MW), the number of hours in 25 years (81,030), and the capacity factor 
(0.37).  The values for capacity, capacity factor, and hours of operation were added to the 
existing incentives section of the RETI model to show the relevant data for the 
calculation of total amount to break even.  This value was added to visualize the total 
amount of revenue needed over the lifespan of a project to offset its costs in a way that is 
more approachable than LCOE. The total amount to break even of each project is 
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compared below, in order to analyze which scenario provides the most amount of support 
for renewable energy production and by how much. The purpose of this analysis is to 
discuss how incentives provide support for renewable energy production and to 
determine the differences between a relatively small incentive (the Nebraska incentive) 
and a larger incentive (the Federal incentive).  
 
Results/Discussion  
With no incentive as a standard for comparison, the total amount to break even was 
$532,756,044.00 (Table 2.3). This means that over the life of the project (25 years) the 
wind farm must make $532,756,044.00 simply to offset the costs of the project.  
 
Table 2.3. Incentives section of RETI model with values for no incentive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PTC ($/MWh) $0.00 
PTC Escalation 0.0% 
PTC Term (years) 0 
ITC 0% 
ITC Depr Basis 0% 
LCOE ($/MWh) $109.58 
Capacity Factor 0.37 
Hours of Operation  81030 
Total Amount to break even $532,756,044 
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The total amount to break even in Table 2.3 accounts for only the costs and 
revenues from the renewable energy project developer with no cost reduction from an 
incentive. However, it serves as a more understandable basis for comparison between the 
presented scenarios. The null scenario total amount to break even compared to the total 
amount of the Nebraska incentive shows a savings of $5,445,216 over the life of the 
project (Table 2.4). With the Nebraska incentive, a renewable energy producer would 
expect to spend $5,445,216 less before offsetting costs and generating a profit, compared 
to the null scenario (without any incentive). However, no incentive compared to the 
federal incentive shows a difference of $126,115,092 over the life of the project (Table 
2.5). With the Federal incentive, a renewable energy producer would expect to spend 
$126,115,092 less before offsetting costs and generating a profit, compared to the null 
scenario.  
 
 
Table 2.4. Incentives section of RETI model with values for the Nebraska incentive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PTC ($/MWh) $0.50 
PTC Escalation 0.0% 
PTC Term (years) 10 
ITC 0% 
ITC Depr Basis 0% 
LCOE ($/MWh) $108.46 
Capacity Factor 0.37 
Hours of Operation 81030.00 
Total Amount to break even $527,310,828.00 
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Table 2.5. Incentives section of RETI model with values for the Federal incentive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These differences are comprised solely from the money given to the utility by the 
incentive program.  If the incentive is a state government program compared to a federal 
program, then the money given to the utility ultimately comes from the taxpayers of that 
state. In the absence of adequately priced externalities, this money appears to be a cost. 
When compared to a system that prices these externalities, however, the costs of fossil-
fuel based energy production are greater than the money invested in renewable energy 
development53.  Nebraska had a population of 1,868,516 people in 2013 according to the 
United States Census Bureau62.  Taking the total savings of the Nebraska incentive 
(~$5.4 million) and dividing it by the population of Nebraska (~1.87 million) gives a cost 
of $2.91 per person over the course of 25 years (the life of the project) or a little under 
$0.12 a year per person. The Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit saw a savings 
of $126,115,092 over the life of the project compared to the null scenario.  This amount 
PTC ($/MWh) $23.00 
PTC Escalation 0.0% 
PTC Term (years) 10 
ITC 0% 
ITC Depr Basis 0% 
LCOE ($/MWh) $83.64 
Capacity Factor 0.37 
Hours of Operation  81030 
Total Amount to break even $406,640,952 
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divided by Nebraska’s population shows a cost of $67.49 per person over the life of the 
project or $2.70 per person per year. Nebraska generated 34,217,293 MWh in 2012 
according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration63.  This generation divided by 
the MWh produced by the renewable energy development (81030 hrs x 60 MW x 0.37 = 
1,798,866 MWh) gives 19.02 which is the number of electricity generation facilities at 60 
MW capacity and with a capacity factor of 0.37 needed to meet total electricity 
generation for Nebraska in 2012.  The incentive amounts of $0.12 and $2.70 per person 
per year become $2.28 and $51.35 per person per year if all electricity production in 
Nebraska is generated from renewable energy plants with similar values to the standards 
set in Tables 2.1 & 2.2 and are incentivized with a program similar to the Renewable 
Electricity Production Tax Credit.  
 The amount needed to break even with the Nebraska incentive is an optimal 
situation in which the program budget is large enough to cover any and all production of 
electricity from a renewable resource.  The program, however, is limited by a budget of 
$50,000 per year according to DSIRE.  This means that for all projects using the 
incentive the total amount of tax credit given cannot amount to more than $50,000 per 
year.  So a project is actually limited to $1,250,000 over the course of 25 years assuming 
it gets all $50,000 of the program budget.  When several projects are using this incentive 
at the same time the projected savings of a project is significantly lower, meaning it is 
less probable that more renewable energy production will develop.  
 Molly Sherlock64 states that the PTC has been important to the growth and 
development of renewable electricity resources, particularly wind.  However, Sherlock 
argues that tax incentives may not be the most economically efficient way to correct for 
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the distortions in energy markets.  Tax subsidies (such as a large number of renewable 
energy incentives are) reduce the average cost of electricity, increasing demand overall.  
This counters the energy efficiency and emissions reduction objectives.   
  
Conclusion 
Incentives serve as a building block for market entry.  In a market that is dominated by 
oil and gas companies, where externalities are not priced adequately, it can be nearly 
impossible for renewable energies to become competitive.  That’s why it is vitally 
important for incentives to play a part in renewable energy generation technologies if 
development is desired.  Without an incentive or other financial tool to make market 
entry easier many renewables simply do not have the capability to enlarge their market 
share and establish themselves in the market.   
 An incentive can be a powerful tool in developing large-scale renewable energy 
generation projects.  While the models were simulated with an average size wind farm 
similar incentives can be found for other renewables as well.  Larger-scale wind projects 
are also already running or currently in production in Nebraska59. However, as energy 
demand increases more and larger renewable energy production facilities must be built to 
meet demand and to meet energy emission standards.  As the capacity of a system 
increases the total cost of the project, the LCOE, and the total amount to break even 
increases.  So a higher demand for energy leads to an increase in energy production, 
leading to more and larger energy projects, leading to increased initial costs, leading to 
potentially more costs for incentives.  This increase is offset by lower energy prices over 
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the life of the renewables and more development leads to an increase in market relevance.  
Incentives serve as a way for a technology or product to enter a market but does not 
dictate what happens once it is established.  So as the market share of renewables 
increases the need for incentives will decrease. 
 A large portion of the accumulated research on regulatory design for renewable 
energy compares alternative options to incentivize it, rather than whether or not it should 
be incentivized50. Examples of this being Butler & Neuhoff51, Menanteau55, Lipp65, and 
Mitchell et al.66.   This leads to the conclusion that it is generally accepted that regulatory 
incentives are needed for renewable energy development. However, there has been some 
success in some electricity markets for hydro-electric power without incentives67.  The 
key differences being base-load power (a constant source rather than an intermittent 
source such as wind or solar) and long life spans of hydroelectric projects which are 
projected at 50 years typically68 compared to 25 years for wind.  
 Renewable energy technology has a higher investment cost compared to non-
renewable energy technology and is an intermittent source of electricity68. Non-
renewable energy technology has a lower investment cost but has additional fuel 
expenditures and carbon emission costs69. There is much research on renewable energy 
and the potential future for renewables in the current electricity system50,55,66,69,70.  This 
chapter shows the effect incentives have on renewable energy production and the costs 
associated with those incentives.  In a market without adequately priced externalities, 
fossil-fuel based energy production is significantly cheaper53 than renewable based 
energy production. When the externalities of fossil-fuel based energy production (impacts 
of climate change) are accounted for the true costs of fossil-fuel based systems become 
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much higher than renewable energy production. In the absence of a system that prices 
externalities for fossil fuels, incentives serve as a way to enable renewable energy 
development and act to indirectly mitigate the impacts of climate change.  
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